

History

Higher level and standard level

Paper 1 – source booklet

10 May 2023

Zone A afternoon | **Zone B** morning | **Zone C** afternoon

1 hour

Instructions to candidates

- Do not open this source booklet until instructed to do so.
- This source booklet contains the sources required for history higher level and standard level paper 1.
- Read all the sources from one prescribed subject.
- The sources in this paper may have been edited and/or abridged: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

Prescribed subject	Sources
1: Military leaders	A – D
2: Conquest and its impact	E – H
3: The move to global war	I – L
4: Rights and protest	M – P
5: Conflict and intervention	Q – T

Prescribed subject 1: Military leaders

Read sources A to D and answer questions 1 to 4. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Genghis Khan (1200–1227) — Campaigns: Mongol invasion of Khwarezmia (1219–1221).

Source A Steven R Ward, a professor at the US Naval Academy, writing in the academic book *Immortal: A military History of Iran and its Armed Forces* (2009).

The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were catastrophic for Persia as a series of Mongol invasions devastated the region. The Khwarezmian ruler Muhammad Shah II (ruled 1206–21) caused his own destruction by mistreating Mongol merchants and diplomats, and intentionally insulting Genghis Khan. In response to these insults, Genghis declared war and sent four armies with a total strength of two hundred thousand warriors against Muhammad in 1219. The opponents both had cavalry forces armed with bows and used similar tactics, but the discipline and coordination of the Mongols were superior. In addition, Genghis had thousands of Chinese siege engineers, who enabled his armies to build and use battering rams, catapults, and other war machines. The Mongols proved unstoppable, spreading devastation wherever they went. In 1220, the Mongols plundered Bukhara and then sacked Samarkand and brutally massacred its citizens. During the war, the Mongols destroyed the centuries-old underground irrigation system that had helped Persian agriculture prosper. The result was that the Mongols left behind expanding deserts and numerous isolated oasis cities. Overall, the Mongol violence killed up to three quarters of the population of the region, possibly ten to fifteen million people.

Source B Maristella Botticini and Zvi Eckstein, professors of economic history, writing in the academic book *The Chosen Few* (2012).

In 1219, after conquering most of Central Asia, Genghis Khan invaded northern Persia and Armenia. On his way to the Middle East, he sacked many cities including Samarkand, which was one of the largest and most commercial cities along the Silk Route from Europe to China. Genghis Khan used his large army both to invade new territories and to control his newly established empire. The basic military strategy of the Mongol rulers was to generate fear and terror; to loot and collect all valuables and food for their army and for Mongol civilian consumption; and to impose heavy taxes in many forms. As a consequence, urban centres collapsed and agricultural production fell sharply. The population of the invaded territories declined dramatically as a result of massacres, epidemics, and famines.

Source C

Minhaj al-Siraj Juzjani, a 13th-century Persian historian, writing in *A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia* (completed c1260).

When Genghis Khan began his conquests and all fell into his hands, the news of these successes reached Muhammad Shah II, and he became filled with ambition. Genghis Khan sent trustworthy and confidential persons of his own, bearing numerous rare items as presents to Muhammad. Genghis Khan requested that envoys on both sides, and merchants, should constantly come and go, and bring and take away with them arms, cloths, and other valuables. Genghis Khan asked that between the two monarchs a permanent treaty should be maintained. He sent merchants to Muhammad, with about five hundred camel-loads of gold, silver, and silks, together with other precious items. They entered the territory of Islam by way of Utrar. At that place, there was a governor named Kadr Khan, and he sent an account to Muhammad Shah describing the importance and value of the merchandise. The governor plotted and asked permission from Muhammad to stop the party of merchants. Having obtained permission to do so, he seized the envoys and all the merchants, and killed them, and took possession of all their property, and sent it to Muhammad. Of that party, there was one person, a camel-driver, who succeeded in making his escape. He returned and made Genghis aware of the betrayal of Kadr Khan of Utrar and the slaughter of the party. Genghis Khan prepared to take revenge.

Source D

An unknown artist depicts a city under Mongol siege in the region. From the *Compendium of Chronicles* by Persian historian, Rashid al-Din Hamadani (c1307).



End of prescribed subject 1


Prescribed subject 2: Conquest and its impact

Read sources E to H and answer questions 5 to 8. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: The conquest of Mexico and Peru (1519–1551) — Key events and actors: Key actors: Diego de Almagro, Malinche, Atahualpa, Moctezuma II; Bartolomé de las Casas; Juan Gines Sepúlveda.

Source E Nancy Fitch, a professor of history, writing in the online article on “*The Conquest of Mexico – An Overview*” on the website of the American Historical Association.

Before the arrival of the Spaniards, many omens [signs] predicted an impending [coming] disaster. Thus, when the Aztec leader Emperor Moctezuma II learned of the arrival of strangers, the omens predicting destruction dominated his imagination. Adding to Moctezuma’s difficulties was the ruthlessness of his rule. Moctezuma engaged in constant warfare in order to obtain victims for human sacrifices as well as manpower/labour for agricultural labour and urban construction. At the same time, while he and his ancestors had constructed a large empire in Central America, they had never achieved the kind of support necessary to rule such a diverse population. Instead, they relied on terror, which also led to numerous revolts. When the Spaniards arrived on the coast of Mexico, many indigenous people viewed them as liberators and joined them against the Aztecs.

Source F Diego Muñoz Camargo, a 16th century Mexican chronicler, depicts the encounter between the Spanish and indigenous peoples at Texcoco in *The History of Tlaxcala* (c1585). The Spanish figure near the temple is Hernán Cortés. Next to Cortés is Prince Ixtlilxochitl, leader of Texcoco.



Source G

Guilhem Olivier, an historian, writing an academic review of a book on Moctezuma II in the journal *Latin American Antiquity* (2015).

The Aztec emperor Moctezuma II used several strategies to fight against the Spaniards and resist their advance. Later, he took drastic measures against the foreigners. According to some historians, the Cholula massacre—commonly cited to condemn the unnecessary violence by Cortés—was actually a response to Moctezuma’s planned ambush. When accused by Cortés, Moctezuma had to confess that his troops were already surrounding the city; also, the Spanish garrison in Veracruz was attacked at the same moment as the trap was set at Cholula. Historians emphasize the tactical importance of this attempt to defeat the Conquistadores in a closed location where the effectiveness of Spanish weaponry would be reduced. This event leads to a revaluation of Moctezuma’s personality. It challenges the myths used to spread the image of defenceless peaceful Indians waiting until the last moment to fight against the Spaniards, who then took revenge and carried out excessive slaughter. It shows that the Aztecs indeed defended themselves, and above all that Moctezuma II was not the superstitious and cowardly ruler who abandoned his empire without putting up a fight against the Spaniards.

Source H

Hernán Cortés, a Spanish conquistador, writing in his second letter to Emperor Charles V (October 1520).

I spoke to those messengers of Moctezuma II who remained with me, about the treachery that had been plotted against me in the city of Cholula. The leaders of the city confirmed that the ambush had been carried out on the advice of Moctezuma. Moctezuma said he was my friend, while on the other hand he devised plans for injuring me. Later, his own messengers told me that Moctezuma was much saddened over the violence that had happened in Cholula. They said that I must believe that it had not been on his advice and order, for they assured me it was not so. Although the people who were stationed in Cholula were Moctezuma’s, they had moved without his orders, persuaded by the natives of Cholula, who bordered on two of his provinces. The messengers said that there existed a certain alliance between indigenous communities, for helping each other, thus they had come to Cholula, and not on Moctezuma’s orders. In the future [the messengers said], I should learn from his actions, that what he had told me was true, though he still begged me not to enter his territory. Moctezuma said it was an unproductive land, and that we would suffer hardships, and that from wherever I might be I could ask him for whatever I wanted, and he would send it very promptly.

End of prescribed subject 2

Prescribed subject 3: The move to global war

Read sources I to L and answer questions 9 to 12. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: German and Italian expansion (1933–1940) — Causes of expansion: Appeasement.

Source I Winston Churchill, a British politician, in a speech to Parliament (5 October 1938).

I will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget, but which must nevertheless be stated, namely that [at Munich] we have sustained a total and absolute defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we have. When I think of the hope for peace which still existed in Europe at the beginning of 1933, when Hitler first obtained power, and of all the opportunities of slowing the growth of Nazi power which have been thrown away, I cannot believe that a similar situation exists in history. So far as this country is concerned, the responsibility must rest with those who have had control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from rearming, nor did they [the British government] rearm themselves in time. They discredited the League of Nations and neglected to make alliances, leaving us without adequate national defence or effective international security.

Source J Table featured in historian Robert Paul Shay's academic book *British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and Profits* (1977).

British armed forces defence expenditure in millions of British Pounds (£) between 1933–1939					
Year	Navy	Army	Air Force	Total Defence Expenditure (in millions of British Pounds £)	As a % of government spending
1933	53.4	37.5	16.7	107.7	14%
1934	56.6	39.7	17.6	113.9	14%
1935	64.9	44.7	27.5	137.0	15%
1936	81.0	55.0	50.0	186.0	21%
1937	101.9	72.7	81.8	256.4	26%
1938	132.4	121.5	143.5	397.5	38%
1939	181.8	242.4	294.8	719.0	48%

Source K Stephen G Walker, a professor of politics, writing in the article “Solving the Appeasement Puzzle” for the *British Journal of International Studies* (1980).

The British government recognized Hitler’s unreasonable plans but were incapable of stopping him. British parliamentary and public opinion would not support the measures necessary to stop Hitler before 1939. Memories of the First World War made it difficult for British leaders to justify rapid armament, alliances and military intervention when a policy of negotiations existed as an alternative. The pointlessness of negotiations did not become clear until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Similarly, Britain’s global commitments meant that during the 1930s British interests faced threats from Germany in Europe, Italy in Africa and the Mediterranean, and Japan in the Far East, which could no longer be defended by the Royal Navy. It has been estimated that two or three years were required to increase British armament to the necessary levels. Britain needed to have begun rearmament in the early 1930s to have built a strong military force by the late 1930s. However, the British government’s appeasement policy could be seen as a sensible strategy at the time.

Source L Donald E Shepardson, a professor of history, writing in the article “A Faraway Country: Munich Reconsidered” for the journal *The Midwest Quarterly* (2006).

One point of view claims that Britain and France betrayed a loyal ally, Czechoslovakia, for “peace in our time” at Munich, in September 1938. However, since the spring of 1936, when Hitler occupied the Rhineland and began rearming Germany, along with the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in October of 1936 it had become obvious to Chamberlain that war might be coming, and a repeat of the horrors of the First World War should be avoided at all costs. The British and French knew that they must rearm and prepare for war while doing everything they could to avoid it. There was the chance, Chamberlain believed, that a war could be avoided by a negotiated agreement that recognized German interests. In Britain, most of Chamberlain’s Conservative Party supported this policy of appeasement, but many did not, most notably Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. The opposition parties were also divided. Many in Britain and France believed they could not win another war against Germany, and they certainly could not win a war against Germany, Italy, and Japan. Chamberlain’s promise of “peace in our time” became absurd when Hitler seized the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

End of prescribed subject 3

Prescribed subject 4: Rights and protest

Read sources M to P and answer questions 13 to 16. The sources and questions relate to case study 1: Civil rights movement in the United States (1954–1965) — Nature and characteristics of discrimination: Segregation and education: Little Rock (1957).

Source M Martin Luther King speaking at the Annual Convention of the National Bar Association [the oldest and largest organization of African American lawyers] (20 August 1959).

We must face the painful fact that there are still enemies of democracy seeking to defend segregation. They have joined in a campaign of defiance. The recent mob demonstration in Little Rock, Arkansas, is a clear example of the extreme methods that some will follow. But there are some hopeful signs. Even in Little Rock we must congratulate the police force for its determined action in handling the mob that assembled around Central High School last week. Their actions made it clear that they were determined to keep the episode of 1957 peaceful. We must also congratulate most white citizens of Little Rock for rejecting the irresponsible leadership of Governor Faubus. What we see in Little Rock is something revealing. Two powerful institutions have collided in the South: segregation and the institution of public schools. The people have made it clear that they will choose public schools rather than segregation. So maybe we shouldn't be so hard on Governor Faubus for, however ironical it may sound, he has done more to promote the cause of integration than almost any personality this decade. His irresponsible actions brought the issue to the forefront of the conscience of the nation and allowed people to see how pointless the attempt to close Central High School was.

Source N Jon Kennedy, a cartoonist, depicts the situation in Little Rock in the cartoon “Making a tough job tougher” for the American newspaper the *Arkansas Democrat* (1958).



Source O

Fred Greenstein, a professor of political science, talking about civil rights in an interview for a US television documentary, *The American Experience: Eisenhower* (1993).

What I would say about Eisenhower and civil rights really are two things. One is that he is cautious and believes in evolutionary change and not revolutionary change. So, his first instinct was not to take a moral position about civil rights. Secondly, when he does have to take such a position, his instinct is not to engage in specific arguments. He did that very impressively at the time of Little Rock when he had understood the significance of returning from his summer vacation and speaking from the White House, the symbolic home of Lincoln. Eisenhower understood that in this moment, the President did not need to be identified as a champion of civil rights, but as a defender of law and order. But this was too late. Eisenhower had allowed the situation to go downhill. Regarding civil rights, I think the problem was that he was after all a “go slow” conservative on domestic social change. He didn’t see the need to advance more quickly. He didn’t understand that the increasing demands for civil rights required genuine meaningful leadership.

Source P

An article titled “*The Age of Eisenhower – The Struggle for Civil Rights*” from a section on political history on the website of the University of Virginia (2021).

President Eisenhower never wished to become a champion of civil rights. The issue made him uncomfortable, and he often expressed his opinion that black activists wanted too much change, too quickly. But the president also refused to allow school boards and state politicians to defy the rulings of the Supreme Court. When the school board in Little Rock, aided by segregationist Governor Faubus and the Arkansas National Guard, sought to prevent black students from attending school in September 1957, Eisenhower moved decisively. He ordered troops of the 101st Airborne [an elite military unit] to take command of the school and allow black students to enter the school building unharmed by angry mobs. In an address to the nation on September 24, he expressed “sadness” for the decision to send troops to the city but said “the President’s authority is inescapable.” Unless he carried out the orders of federal courts, “anarchy would result.” Eisenhower avoided the moral questions at hand. He did not champion the need for equality and fairness in America. Many felt that Eisenhower should have done more to express his support for the moral cause of justice and equality for all. But Eisenhower had a narrow view of the matter. His duty as President was to uphold federal court orders. He found a middle way through a terribly difficult problem that would torment later Presidents for many decades.

End of prescribed subject 4

Prescribed subject 5: Conflict and intervention

Read sources Q to T and answer questions 17 to 20. The sources and questions relate to case study 2: Kosovo (1989–2002) — Course and interventions: Response of the international community; response of the UN; NATO bombing campaign; Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Source Q

Bill Clinton, President of the US, addressing the nation in a televised broadcast to announce the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military action in Kosovo (24 March 1999).

My fellow Americans, today our armed forces joined our NATO allies in airstrikes against Serbian forces responsible for the brutality in Kosovo. We have acted with determination for several reasons. We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a dangerous situation at the heart of Europe, that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. We act to stand united with our allies. By acting now, we are upholding our values. Now I want to be clear with you, there are risks in this military action—risk to our pilots and the people on the ground. Serbia's air defences are strong. It could decide to intensify its assault on Kosovo, or to seek to harm us or our allies elsewhere. If it does, we will deliver a forceful response.

Source R

Kevin Siers, a political cartoonist, depicting the effects of NATO's bombing campaign in Kosovo in a cartoon for the American newspaper *The Charlotte Observer* (1999). The caption reads "NATO, do me a favour! Don't do me any more favours!". The wording on the bag is "Kosovars" (the citizens of Kosovo).



Source S Javier Solana, NATO Secretary-General, writing in the article “NATO’s Success in Kosovo” for the journal *Foreign Affairs* (November 1999).

NATO’s Kosovo operation was a major challenge in the history of the NATO alliance. For the first time, a defensive alliance launched a military campaign to avoid a humanitarian crisis outside its borders. For the first time, an alliance of sovereign nations fought not to conquer or preserve territory but to protect the values on which the alliance was founded. And despite many challenges, NATO prevailed. Over the course of 1998, fighting between the Kosovar Albanian and Serb forces grew and 300,000 Kosovar civilians fled their homes. UN Resolution 1199 of September 23, 1998, spoke of an “impending humanitarian catastrophe” and characterized the developments as “a threat to peace and security in the region.” NATO brought the Serbs and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) together at Rambouillet, France, in February 1999. After difficult negotiations, the Kosovar Albanians signed the agreement on March 18. [Slobodan] Milošević, however, rejected it. NATO’s use of force did not come about unexpectedly. It happened after all diplomatic means had been exhausted. The air campaign achieved every one of its goals. Milošević accepted NATO’s demands on June 3. After 77 days, with no casualties of its own, NATO had prevailed. A humanitarian disaster had been avoided. About one million refugees could now return in safety. Ethnic cleansing had been reversed. No Serbian forces remain in Kosovo. NATO’s current peacekeeping force is stronger than anything considered previously.

Source T G Gerard Ong, a researcher specializing in international security studies, writing in the article “Credibility over Courage: NATO’s Mis-Intervention in Kosovo” for the *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2003).

The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998, when fighting broke out, resulting in the displacement of 300 000 Albanians from their homes. A peace conference, commonly known as the Rambouillet Accords, broke up in March 1999 with the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to accept the terms of the settlement. On 24 March 1999 NATO forces began air operations over Yugoslavia in search of a resolution to the Kosovo crisis. Continued negotiations between NATO and President Milošević during the aerial bombing campaign did not lead to a successful outcome. Finally, on 3 June 1999 the Serbian President agreed to withdraw Serbian troops on terms presented by the European Union (EU) and Russia... The outcome of NATO’s military intervention is not at all clear to us. Some reports argue that NATO members were certainly not all in agreement regarding either the goals of the campaign or the means to achieve them. Other reports describe the increasing exodus of Albanian refugees as well as an intensified ethnic cleansing campaign by Serbian forces during the bombing campaign. According to these sources, NATO’s objective of “stopping the killing” was not achieved at all.

End of prescribed subject 5

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References:

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